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I do not know whether Tom Wolfe has reviewed Rawls' A Theory of
Justice,1 and I cannot remember a serious critique of Habermas or
Horkheimer in recent issues of People magazine. It is this novel intellec-
tual form, however, which the multi-talented Bruce Ackerman refines in
Reconstructing American Law.' The book's bold objective is to account for
the intellectual sources responsible for the expansion of federal govern-
mental activity since the 1930's. But Ackerman is not interested in the
inherent strengths or weaknesses of the justifications for government ac-
tion, nor quite in the influence of these ideas on the actual growth of
government. Instead, Ackerman is concerned with how policymakers, par-
ticularly lawyers, have talked about these ideas. The subject of conse-
quence to Ackerman is the relationship over the last fifty years between
justifications for government action and the content of what Ackerman
calls, variously, "law-talk," "lawstuff,"4 "legal discourse, ' 5 "legitimated
[legal] conversation,"' and the "new language of power."'7
This unusual approach represents a new and significant synthesis of
the central theme of Ackerman's scholarly work. In 1977, in the first book
of the series, Private Property and the Constitution,8 Ackerman described
two world views competing for control of modern legal culture-views
which he called "ordinary observing" and "scientific policymaking." Ac-
cording to Ackerman, each conception sought to dominate the characteri-
zation of modern legal issues by imposing different constraints on legal
language. The battle between them would determine control over "the lin-
- Professor of Law, Yale University. I am grateful to Owen M. Fiss and Anthony T. Kronman
for very helpful criticisms of an earlier draft, and to Franco Romani for encouragement, but I am
responsible for what remains.
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).







8. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977) [hereinafter cited as
PRIVATE PROPERTY].
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guistic practices of a special group of conversationalists . . . trained as
lawyers."' Ackerman illustrated the hypothesis by showing that the vari-
ous and confused approaches toward interpreting the takings clause were
only different elaborations of one of the two competing linguistic
methods."'
Ackerman's concern with language was generalized in 1980. In Social
Justice in the Liberal State,"1 Ackerman employed the method of "con-
strained conversation" as a technique for drawing out the implications of
his philosophy of neutrality.12 Here again, it was language or conversa-
tion that dominated the presentation, although the link to Ackerman's
concerns in Private Property was left totally obscure. In Social Justice,
dialogue and conversation appeared to serve chiefly as an organizing con-
ceit for Ackerman's argument. Ackerman hints in the book-although he
never really develops the point-that the preoccupation with conversation
about moral ideas is something more than conceit. Dialogue and conversa-
tion, of course, are methods of legitimating one's views about social policy.
But there is also a suggestion that the process of conversation possesses
moral significance in itself, derived in some way from its seemingly guar-
anteed success in leading individuals to confront and accept Ackerman's
moral imperatives.1 s
Reconstructing American Law reveals the unity and ambition of Acker-
man's vision over these many years. The book is a chronicle of a conflict
that Ackerman claims has dominated legal culture since the 1930's, pitting
the world view of the pre-1930's "reactive state" against the world view of
the "activist state" inaugurated with the New Deal. The conceptual ap-
proaches of the reactive and activist states closely resemble ordinary ob-
serving and scientific policymaking of Private Property.,, Moreover, the
battleground for the competition between these contrasting conceptual ap-
proaches is the content of dialogue about legal issues. In Reconstructing
American Law, however, the legal dialogue, the "law-talk," shows itself to
possess a new significance. In his earlier books, conversation represented
only a reflection of more substantive intellectual differences or a technique
9. See Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, 22 NoMos 351, 351 (1980) (describing ambi-
tions of Private Property and the Constitution) [hereinafter cited as Four Questions].
10. Id. at 351-53.
11. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL
JUSTICE].
12. Id. at 8-10; see Four Questions, supra note 9 (elaborating conversation theme of Private
Property and the Constitution).
13. See SOCIAL JUsTICE, supra note 11, at 357-75. For an effort to extend Ackerman's approach
to dialogue beyond its role in Social Justice itself, see Agger, A Critical Theory of Dialogue, 4 Hu-
MANITIES IN Soc'y 7 (1981); see also Weale, Book Review, 65 MINN. L. REV. 685 (1981) (discussing
role of conversation in Social Justice).
14. The link between "ordinary observing" as a conceptual framework and the commitment of the
reactive state to laissez-faire is made clear in Four Questions, supra note 9, at 367-69.
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for presenting a moral argument. In the current book, conversation itself
becomes the central phenomenon of importance. The ideas that form the
foundations of the contrasting world views are necessary to stimulate legal
conversation, but it is the subsequent conversation or dialogue about the
ideas that is truly important.
As we shall see, many unusual and peculiar conclusions result from
Ackerman's focus on conversation about ideas, rather than on the ideas
themselves. Indeed, Ackerman's approach initiates a truly novel form of
legal scholarship: the Rona Barrett theory of intellectual history. Accord-
ing to this approach, specific ideas are worthy of little attention. How
people talk about ideas is the matter of moment. Original ideas are only
minor source points for creative elaboration, in the same way that know-
ing what Henry Kissinger actually mumbled at Studio 54 would spoil the
fun.
I. A THEORY OF THE ACKERMAN PROJECT
Ackerman's subject is the transformation of the concept of law from
that of the "reactive state" of the 1930's to that of the "activist state" of
today.15 As Ackerman tells the story, policymakers prior to the 1930's had
complete faith in the just and efficient operation of competitive market
forces. They saw no need for the federal government to manipulate the
country's economic welfare or concern itself with questions of social jus-
tice. Moreover, America's geographic isolation eliminated the need for
more than minimal investments in military force." The thoughtful lawyer
viewed "self-conscious state intervention in the market economy as a rela-
tively extraordinary event." 17 The only relevant law was the common law,
whose role was dispute resolution.
This view of the world constrained the form and content of legal argu-
ment: "No legal argument [was] acceptable if it require[d] the lawyer to
question the legitimacy of the military, economic, and social arrangements
generated by the invisible hand.""8 The law served only to complement
the market, and legal issues were conceived of in terms of their market
analogues. The paradigmatic dispute was between two parties who to-
gether were "in the best position to develop the facts and values relevant
to a just decision."1 9 The dispute could be resolved in a manner consistent
15. The core of Ackerman's book appears as an introductory essay to a Symposium sponsored by
the Yale Law Journal on the role of the activist state fifty years after the New Deal. See Ackerman,




19. P. 26. Ackerman explicitly draws from the Kuhnian concept of paradigms. P. 60 n.16. Thus,
it is odd that he regards a reluctance to challenge the legitimacy of some prevailing conceptual frame-
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with governing principles of justice by asking a lay jury to determine
which of the litigants "deviated" more sharply from established market
norms.
2 0
The New Deal fundamentally contradicted this view of the role of law.
Most important, according to Ackerman, was "the sheer quantity" of
New Deal legislation,21 which reduced the common law from its preemi-
nent position to "only one branch of a trinitarian legal system," which
now also included "statutory enactment and bureaucratic practice . . . as
constitutionally legitimate sources of general principle."22
Yet although the New Deal repudiated the laissez-faire foundations of
the "reactive state"2 and generated a completely new legal order, it did
not affect the way policymakers talked about the law. Until roughly 1960,
lawyers and policymakers continued to view the law in "reactive state"
terms: to regard the competitive market as the norm and government in-
tervention as the deviation. How was this possible? According to Acker-
man, the post-New Deal contradiction between the law as it existed and
the law as lawyers understood it was mediated by Legal Realism. 24
Here, Ackerman's story becomes complicated. The intellectual mission
of the Realists was to destroy the theory that the individual common law
fields (property, torts, and contracts) were cleanly distinguishable and in-
ternally coherent.25 The belief in a coherent common law had inspired the
efforts of the first Restatements of Law, which were catalogues of princi-
ples of each of the common law subjects. The method of the Realists was
to unveil the "so-called organizing concepts of the common law" as
"empty boxes concealing a host of distinct fact situations that required a
sensitive response by Realistic lawyers with situation sense."28 According
to Ackerman, the essence of Realism was skepticism about abstraction and
confidence in intuition. 27 The Realists, however, were skeptical of all ab-
stractions. As a consequence, they successfully destroyed the theory of a
unified common law, but did not supplant it with their own affirmative
conception of law. Moreover, the Realists' emphasis on particularistic
complexity snuffed out all other efforts to create a theory of law consistent
with the extensive governmental intervention of the New Deal. Legal Re-
alism, according to Ackerman, was essentially "a culturally conservative
work as characteristic of only the reactive state world view rather than of all world views.
20. P. 27. The similarity of thinking of the reactive state to ordinary observing described in Pri-
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movement."28 Realism allowed the legal profession to "survive the politi-
cal crisis [of the New Deal] with its basic discursive equipment intact."2 9
The conceptual revolution that provided the vision for the modern ac-
tivist state was the Chicago School law and economics of Ronald Coase.
Coase provided "a model of a new form of power-talk,"3 0 in which every
human activity affects other human activities and all questions are ques-
tions of coordination. The Coasean approach compelled systemic, rather
than particularistic, examination of every problem of social policy. Acker-
man acknowledges the cautionary tenor of Coase's original article.3 " But
as Coase's article has come to be understood by lawyers, caution is mer-
ited only in the absence of transaction costs.32 In the real world, transac-
tion costs are always present. As a consequence, Coase's influence on the
"conversational domain" was to show a world characterized by pervasive
market failure.3 3 After Coase, understanding what is truly at stake in a
legal issue requires "the complex description of the ways in which actors,
constrained by heavy transaction costs and bounded rationality, are likely
to respond to an array of second-best legal interventions."34 For Acker-
man, Coase's Chicago School economics provides the conversational basis
for massive governmental intervention in all sectors of human life.
Coase and the economists, however, provided no guidance as to the val-
ues which such intervention should express. Instead, fashioning affirma-
tive values for modern legal discourse-what Ackerman calls reconstruct-
ing law-is the task of modern moral philosophers. Ackerman's careful
survey of modern moral philosophy identifies two philosophers in particu-
lar who have successfully influenced modern "Constructivist argument":
John Rawls in his well-known A Theory ofJustice 5 and Ackerman him-
self in Social Justice in the Liberal State."6
It is Ackerman's description of these two alternative moral approaches
that reveals the deeper conception of the book and its position in Acker-
man's intellectual project of the past decade. Ackerman does not regard
the modern moral conversation as complete; the reconstruction of Ameri-
can law is still in progress, and will continue for many years. As Acker-
man rigorously compares Rawls and Ackerman as alternative philosophi-
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wanting. Ackerman criticizes the abstract and alien character of Rawls'
technique of the veil of ignorance."' Moreover, according to Ackerman,
the bargaining metaphors that attend the decision process behind the veil
cannot be fully descriptive of "the basic terms of activist legitimacy," 38
presumably because consensual bargaining is the essential feature of the
now-deposed world of laissez-faire.
A superior way of determining the substantive values appropriate for
our activist state is "legal disputation itself.""9 Ackerman invokes our na-
tion's history as evidence: "When Americans think they have been de-
prived of their rights, they characteristically express their grievances in
legal terms-and insist that courts, no less than legislatures, take their
demands for justice seriously."' 40 It is the legal process of complaint and
answer that compels each citizen to frame "a legally acceptable response
to the question of legitimacy: What gives you, rather than me, the right to
the resource we both seek to employ?"4'
Here, the connection between Ackerman's moral philosophy and the
current book becomes clear. In Social Justice in the Liberal State, Acker-
man claims that all exercises of power require justification, and that all
questions of moral legitimacy can be resolved by invoking two principles
of neutrality: (a) no citizen's conception of the good is better than that
asserted by any other citizen, and (b) regardless of conception of good, no
citizen is intrinsically superior to any fellow citizen.42 The task of Social
Justice is to apply these principles to the wide range of questions of social
policy in order to define and justify the proper contours of our liberal
state.
The peculiar feature of Social Justice, however, is the technique Acker-
man adopts to define the implications of the neutrality principles. Acker-
man is not content with simple explanation or straightforward reasoning.
Instead, he addresses each issue by constructing an imaginary dialogue
between two individuals, in which, invariably, one asserts a position that
Ackerman opposes and the second invokes one of Ackerman's neutrality
principles at the right moment, shocking the other discussant into silence.
From my own experience, I suspect that many readers found these inces-
sant dialogues distracting, and increasingly tedious, although some review-
37. Pp. 94-96. Ackerman possesses a highly developed sense of the alien. Ackerman's philosophi-
cal technique is to present spaceship dialogues over the distribution of manna, moderated by his Space





42. SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 10-11.
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ers praised them as "fascinating" and characterized by "verve." 43 At a
minimum, the technique of "constrained conversation" appears to be a
very peculiar stylistic device because it bears no obvious relation to Acker-
man's substantive premises and conclusions beyond satisfying the require-
ment of legitimation. Toward the end of SocialJustice, Ackerman suggests
a grander role for dialogue: Dialogue by itself can lead individuals to ac-
cept the neutrality principles because it requires acknowledgement of the
autonomy of others and skepticism about the reality of transcendent
meaning."" Thus, there may be a double-faceted interrelationship between
dialogue and the neutrality principles: Dialogue as a legitimating method
is constrained by the neutrality principles. In addition, the technique of
dialogue requires its participants to confront their personal non-neutral
predispositions and may lead to acceptance of the neutrality principles.
But this argument is not fully developed.
Reconstructing American Law, however, reveals Ackerman's deeper
purpose and the unifying themes of his seemingly disparate scholarly
work. Ackerman the lawyer is constructing a moral philosophy of lawyer-
ing, and demonstrating that this philosophy, with the intellectual appara-
tus of dialogue that fuels it, can explain the most important development
in the United States and the western world of the past century: the tre-
mendous expansion of government and the rise of the activist state.
As I interpret Ackerman's idea (it has never been stated in these
terms),4 5 it is this: The legal process compels litigants to engage in a form
of argument in which one party makes a claim of right to which another
party must respond. This form of "conversation" leads parties to accept
values similar to Ackerman's neutrality principles."6 Ackerman, of course,
hopes to speed along this process by open advocacy of the neutrality prin-
ciples. The fundamentally dialogic character of the legal process, however,
suggests that it ought to be regarded as the central and fundamental
source of moral value in a liberal society, because of its role as a source of
moral training through argumentation and as the institution that ex-
presses and applies moral values of the greatest legitimacy in contexts of
competing moral claims. Certainly, the moral superiority of the legal pro-
cess to the democratic political process is clear.47 Conversation within the
43. Agger, supra note 13, at 11; Walzer, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1980, at 39, 40.
44. SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 357-75. Of course, dialogue is not a necessary condition
for the acceptance of these principles.
45. Ackerman gives a somewhat different-though I believe incomplete-account of his project in
The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1045 n.61 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Discovering the Constitution].
46. Presumably, the citizenry will accept these values once everyone becomes involved in
litigation.
47. Ackerman's preference for the judicial over the democratic process is criticized in MacRae,
Scientific Poliyinaking and Compensation for the Taking of Property, 22 NoMos 327 (1980).
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democratic process is of a much different character. Claims of personal
advantage, in some guise, are commonplace.' 8 Moral precepts, such as the
neutrality principles, may exert some suasion on the political conversa-
tion,49 but they do not act as determinative constraints as they do over
legal dialogue."
Thus, changes over time in the content of conversation within the legal
order describe the changing basis for the moral legitimacy of the state.
Ackerman demonstrated in Private Property and the Constitution that the
most important change in the legal conversation of the past century was
the shift from a world view that embraced legal reasoning using the con-
cepts of ordinary language and that was committed to laissez-faire to the
New Deal world view of scientific policymaking, which justifies and legit-
imates today's activist state. The current book, Reconstructing American
Law, presents the detailed history of this transformation in the legal con-
versation during the past fifty years. But because legal dialogue possesses
an inherent moral significance, Ackerman's book is more than history:
Ackerman's chronicle of law-talk is the record of our country's moral
growth.
II. LAW-TALK AND ITS SOURCES
I wish to make clear at the outset that I greatly admire Ackerman's
ambition and the sustained seriousness of his scholarly project. The expli-
cation of the sources of the expansion of government in western society
obviously is a subject of the greatest importance. To link the explication to
a coherent and defensible moral philosophy would constitute a stunning
intellectual achievement. Even on a more limited scale, a careful definition
of the relationship between legal scholarship and some set of dominant
conceptions of law is worthy of serious attention, and various of Acker-
man's specific points are highly compelling. Yet there is a peculiar charac-
ter to Ackerman's account of the activist state that calls for more detailed
examination.
I have mentioned that Ackerman's approach cannot be described accu-
rately as traditional intellectual history. Indeed, although Ackerman's sub-
ject is the influence of ideas on general conceptions of government, he
devotes no attention whatsoever to the original ideas themselves. Despite
the central role of Legal Realism-mediating the conflict between laissez-
48. For abundant illustrations, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
(1981) [hereinafter cited as CLEAN COAL].
49. SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 275.
50. Ackerman's current project is to describe with more care those conversational constraints oper-
ative in the legislative and constitutional process. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 45, at
1052-57.
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faire and the New Deal-there are only passing references to the writings
of the Realists. Similarly, though Ronald Coase is the hero of the
piece-because he provided the justification for the activist state-there
are only two references to Coase's writings, and none to any element of
the massive literature debating and expounding Coase.
Of course, Ackerman should be judged according to his argument rather
than his erudition, but the specific meanings that Ackerman attributes to
these writings are most curious. According to Ackerman, the legal conver-
sation has drawn from the writings of the Realists and Ronald Coase
messages that are exactly the opposite of the messages intended by the
authors and of the interpretations that most students of these authors have
long accepted.
For example, Ackerman describes Legal Realism as essentially a con-
servative movement whose approach permitted the legal order to retain its
commitment to laissez-faire principles and to ignore the revolutionary
changes that the New Deal introduced into the legal system.51 This is a
very unusual interpretation of Realism. First, the most important writings
of the Realists preceded the New Deal and, in particular, the "switch in
time" that Ackerman has identified as marking the triumph of the activist
state.52 Indeed, the more common interpretation of Realism is that the
movement helped prepare the way for the New Deal's triumph. 53
Ackerman concedes that Realist writings undermined the presupposi-
tions of the conservative legal order of the 1930's. But he characterizes the
Realists as only debunkers and neglects the dominant normative theme of
the Realist enterprise. Most Realists were strongly opposed to laissez-faire
and were sympathetic to, if not an inspiration of, the legislative and regu-
latory ambitions of the New Deal. It was not commitment to laissez-faire
economics and hostility to the activist state that put Jerome Frank and
William 0. Douglas at the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thur-
man Arnold at the Antitrust Division, and Walton Hamilton at the
T.N.E.C. Investigation.
Moreover, it is impossible to reconcile the Realists' empirical ef-
forts-which were by far the most distinctive aspect of the move-
ment-with sympathy to a laissez-faire legal regime. Realist empirical
work sought to show how limited the relationship was between the free-
market concerns of legal doctrine and the actual and more "realistic" con-
cerns of legal administration. The empirical work of William 0. Douglas
51. Pp. 11-22.
52. See Four Questions, supra note 9, at 368; Discovering the Constitution, supra note 45, at
1052-57.
53. See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experi-
ence, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459, 569-74 (1979).
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on bankruptcy5 and that of Charles E. Clark on law administration 55 and
automobile accidents56 sought to demonstrate that the normative commit-
ment of legal doctrine to laissez-faire principles ignored the most impor-
tant issues that faced judges, juries, and magistrates in administering the
law.57 This work was intended radically to undermine the legal regime
dominant in 1930, characterized by the approach of Lochner v. New
York,"S by showing that the principled coherence of the regime was des-
perately out of touch with the true problems of legal administration. The
radical nature of the Realist vision may appear limited in comparison to
modern critical thought. But it is the baldest form of anachronism to de-
scribe Jerome Frank, William 0. Douglas, and Thurman Arnold as lead-
ers of a conservative movement. Ackerman's focus on the Realists' faith in
intuition and "situation sense" is appropriate only to the work of Karl
Llewellyn,59 eccentric and idiosyncratic even in its own time.
Ackerman's description of the influence of Ronald Coase is even more
peculiar. As Ackerman tells the story, Coase is the founding father of the
activist state because his work convinced the legal community that market
imperfections were pervasive. Even the lay reader will appreciate that giv-
ing credit for the modern activist state to a central figure of Chicago
School economics is, well, a novel insight.60 But lay judgment aside, Ack-
erman's interpretation completely misreads Coase. There are two central
lessons in Coase's famous article.6" The first is behavioral. Coase demon-
strates that regardless of the law or of any initial allocation of resources,
the only obstacle to a subsequent reallocation is transaction costs. It fol-
lows that one can expect private parties to react to changes in the law by
rearranging their mutual affairs to preserve the optimal allocation of re-
sources (given transaction costs) and to seek always to reduce transaction
costs in order to facilitate future rearrangements.
The article's second lesson relates to social policy. By a variety of nu-
54. See Clark, Douglas & Thomas, The Business Failures Project-A Problem in Methodology,
39 YALE L.J. 1013 (1930); Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329
(1932).
55. Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 2 CONN. B.J. 211 (1928).
56. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
(1932).
57. See also Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 44 YALE L.J. 387,
1291 (1935) (explicitly normative effort to reform civil procedure).
58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
59. See Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1942).
60. Oddly, in an earlier book of Ackerman's, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality,
Ackerman documented how various government agencies commenced a form of systemic, scientific
policymaking with respect to pollution in the Delaware River during the 1950's nearly a decade
before the publication of Coase's article. See B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D.
HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974) [hereinafter cited as
UNCERTAIN SEARCH].
61. Coase, supra note 31.
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merical examples, Coase shows that no governmental intervention or non-
intervention can be shown to improve the allocation of resources. First,
there are technical limitations on any demonstration of allocative improve-
ment: Transaction costs cannot be measured; moveover, there is never suf-
ficient information available to understand ultimate economic effects."2
More importantly, because of the reciprocal nature of all incidents of so-
cial harm and the absence of adequately developed moral theories regard-
ing the multitude of activities affected by the legal system, changes in wel-
fare are always ambiguous. The particular implication of this conclusion
is that the Pigovian imperative of internalizing the costs of each factor's
operations in order to equate private and social costs is nonsense, and
cannot be shown to improve social welfare systematically.
These two lessons provide a very strange blueprint for an activist state
committed to curing market failures. Coase's message is ultimately nihilis-
tic. After presenting repeated examples in which attempts to correct mar-
ket failures only further reduce social welfare, Coase concludes that eco-
nomics provides no guide whatsoever to social policy. "As Frank H.
Knight has so often emphasized," Coase announces, "problems of welfare
economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and
morals."' s In fact, Coase's moral judgments over the years were pro-
foundly hostile to every form of the activist state. Coase explicitly dedi-
cated his work as editor of the Journal of Law and Economics to the
battle against governmental regulation." In his earlier work, Coase se-
verely criticized even the "expansion" of government in the sixteenth cen-
tury to preempt the private market for mail delivery.65 Coase's articles
condemning government regulation66 and those that he solicited and pub-
lished in his Journal formed the intellectual foundation for the deregula-
tion movement, which constitutes a sustained attack on the activist state 7
and the most serious commitment to laissez-faire since Mill's Principles of
Political Economy.
62. The argument of Coase's article is explained in more detail in Priest, The Rise of Law and
Economics, J. LEGAL EDuc. (forthcoming).
63. Coase, supra note 31, at 43.
64. See Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago,
1932-1970, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 163, 191-92 (1982).
65. Coase, Rowland Hill and the Penny Post, 6 ECONOMICA 423 (n.s. 1939); Coase, The Postal
Monopoly in Great Britain: An Historical Survey, in ECONOMIC ESSAYS IN COMMEMORATION OF
THE DUNDEE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 1931-1955, at 25 (J. Eastham ed. 1955).
66. E.g., Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1959); Coase, The
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, 5 J.L. & ECON. 17 (1962); Coase, Payola in Radio and
Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 269 (1979).
67. Ackerman acknowledges the deregulation movement. See p. 32. He attempts to reconcile it
with governmental activism by interpreting the objective of the movement as "eliminating misbegotten
or obsolescent initiatives." Id. In my view, Ackerman's interpretation neglects the fundamental com-
mitment of this literature to a return to laissez-faire of the reactive state in place of governmental
activism.
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III. THE INTEGRITY OF LAW-TALK
It might be said that accusing Ackerman of misreading the Realists and
Ronald Coase misses the point. Ackerman does not purport to present a
standard intellectual history of the important literature of the past fifty
years. Perhaps it is enough that Ackerman is interested in describing the
dialogue or conversation between lawyers and policymakers that derived
from the writings of Coase and the Realists. The original texts themselves
should be considered only starting points.
This, I believe, is the most defensible reading of Ackerman's book, but
its shallowness is apparent. Ackerman does not define the relationship be-
tween original ideas and the morally loaded dialogue of interest to him, in
this book or in any other in the series. Nor does Ackerman present evi-
dence confirming his hunches as to the content of the legal conversation.
Clearly, Ackerman is not interested in dialogue between the original
scholars themselves, which could be expected to be true to the ideas of the
scholars. Nor does he seem to be interested in the dialogue about the orig-
inal ideas within the secondary literature" which would closely follow the
ideas. Ackerman does not explain how ideas are translated by policymak-
ers or, at yet a lower level, lawyers, in any systematic way that identifies
their dialogic positions.
What do we know about the development of dialogic content? From
Ackerman's history, we can infer that the post-Realist and post-Coasean
conversations bear no substantive relationship to the original texts from
which they are said to derive. The dialogues of interest to Ackerman are
in substance completely contradictory to the original ideas. One must con-
lude that at best these conversations are based upon impressions of the
original texts, filtered and finally perverted, in subsequent accounts. Put
more sharply, Ackerman's dialogue cannot be distinguished from uncon-
strained gossip about theories of government. The content of this gossip
may or may not bear any resemblance to the original theories themselves.
Ackerman may believe his history of law-talk, but its implications are
devastating to Ackerman's larger intellectual enterprise, if not to ninety-
nine percent of modern legal scholarship. If Ackerman's description is ac-
curate, he has shown that ideas have no coherent influence on social pol-
icy. He has demonstrated that in the world of governmental policy, a
scholar will gain equal credit for an original idea or for its converse. In-
deed, there is no link whatsoever between a theory or idea and how it will
be interpreted by policymakers. Lawyers and policymakers have engaged
for the last half-century in a dialogue inspired by the works of the Real-
ists and Ronald Coase that entirely neglects the substantive conclusions of
68. To which he makes no reference.
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these works. Although the Realists were regarded in their own time as
radicals, they were actually conservatives; Chicago School economists,
while openly and bitterly hostile to all forms of governmental interference
with the marketplace, actually elaborated upon and perfected today's ac-
tivist federal state.
It follows from this conclusion that the efforts of lawyers and legal
scholars to work out sensible and effective ideas about how the govern-
ment might act to improve the lives of its citizens are futile. However
brilliant and persuasive to scholars-and few scholars have failed to be
persuaded by the Realist attack on formalism or by the Coase theo-
rem-ideas have neither autonomy nor ultimate influence. Moreover,
Ackerman's conclusion implies that to criticize government behavior as
unreasonable or ill-founded 9 -that is, for its failure to conform to some
set of rational principles-is a foolish waste of time, because it ignores the
true source of influence. The dialogue from which policies are derived
need not correspond to any logical implication of its original premises.
If Ackerman's account is to be believed, the role of dialogue itself is
diminished from the lofty position suggested in Social Justice. If there is
no necessary connection between the content of dialogue and the original
principles that inspire it, how can we be assured of the moral integrity of
the dialogic process? Why will dialogue generate a commitment to neu-
trality as opposed to a commitment to personal domination or other non-
neutral positions? Must we not suspect that there are forces, other than
the dialogic process or the neutrality principles themselves, that are defin-
ing the content of legal dialogue?
One might answer that I am still judging Ackerman too harshly. Per-
haps Ackerman meant that the Realists and Coase serve only as emblems
of different conversational styles: of the conservative legal thought that
preceded the New Deal and of the systemic analysis characteristic of New
Deal policymaking. But this justification, I believe, undercuts the founda-
tion of Ackerman's project. If the Realists and Coase are emblems, then
Ackerman's conception of conversation has no coherent content. Acker-
man's definitions of the reactive and activist conversations become so
broad that they embrace totally opposing views on the central issues that
the conversations describe. The legal conversation of the reactive state em-
braces both a commitment to laissez-faire and Realist opposition to lais-
sez-faire. The legal conversation of the activist state incorporates both
New Deal regulation designed to supplant laissez-faire and Chicago-
school commitment to laissez-faire designed to supplant New Deal regula-
tion. Perhaps Ackerman has some deeper conception of activism and reac-
69. For one example, see CLsN COAL, supra note 48.
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tivism that transcends the simple chronology hinged at the New Deal. But
it remains unexplained.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING ACKERMAN
These criticisms should not be read to suggest that Ackerman's project
is unredeemable or hopelessly confused. No one doubts that the explana-
tion of the rise of the modern activist state is perhaps the central question
of modern political economy. Moreover, Ackerman's distinction between
the world views of ordinary observing and scientific policymaking are
powerful explanations of much of modern legal discourse. Prominent
scholars besides Ackerman have attempted to define the unique moral
forces of the legal process,70 and, in my view, Ackerman's insistence on
neutrality is a promising starting point.
Yet Ackerman's work in its current form stands as something less than
a coherent project. Each of the books contains insights that are imagina-
tive and that have influenced legal scholarship. But Ackerman aspires to
produce more than a collection of insights, and his readers should demand
more as well. In my view, Ackerman must elaborate five aspects of the
theory before it forms a comprehensive and coherent intellectual project.
First, Ackerman must define more clearly the moral significance of the
dialogic process itself. What moral force inheres in dialogue that is inde-
pendent of the moral argument of the dialogue itself? 1
Second, Ackerman must define more clearly the moral significance he
finds inherent in the legal process. Except as metaphor, the complaint and
answer of modern litigation, couched in strategic formality, do not closely
resemble a moral dialogue. Can Ackerman identify some moral content to
the legal process that is separate from the moral content of the legal rules?
Third, Ackerman must elaborate the relationship between the dialogic
character of the legal process and theories of the appropriate role of gov-
ernment. Private Property and the Constitution's review of litigation in-
volving the takings clause demonstrated persuasively to me that dominant
theories of government influence the structure of legal argument. But the
character and direction of the relationship has never been made clear. Has
the dialogic process of litigation somehow generated different theories of
government? Or is the legal process only a medium for the expression of
conceptions of government derived from other sources?
Fourth, Ackerman must consider how a new vision of government can
arise when preexisting conceptions of the world constrain the legal conver-
70. See, e.g., L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); Pound, The Economic Interpretation
in the Law of Torts, 53 HARv. L. REv. 365 (1940).
71. Michael Walzer makes a similar point in Walzer, supra note 44, at 40.
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sation as tightly as he suggests. More specifically, Ackerman must offer an
account of the origins, conversational or not, of the New Deal. The rise .of
the New Deal and of scientific policymaking is the central phenomenon of
Ackerman's entire enterprise. Yet Ackerman, to my knowledge, has never
attempted to explain the New Deal in terms consistent with his theory. In
Reconstructing American Law, Ackerman provides savvy commentary on
intellectual currents from mid-nineteenth century reactivism to late-
twentieth century law and economics. But the New Deal and its scientific
policymaking remain strangely (and damagingly) exogenous to the
account.
Finally, Ackerman must provide more convincing evidence that the ac-
tual growth of government is related to ideas about government-to the
translation of these ideas in the legal conversation, as well as to some
feature of the legal process. Ackerman seems committed to idealistic,
rather than materialistic, explanations of behavior and, in particular, of
government behavior. Yet his elaborate praise of Ronald Coase and the
central position he gives in many of his works to the economic approach
toward behavior 2 seem contradictory. Ackerman attempts to reconcile the
contradiction in Reconstructing American Law by characterizing economic
analysis as only relevant to a conception of facts, while some richer philo-
sophic framework can control policymaking.73 If world views and societal
conceptions are as dominant as Ackerman believes, this approach is un-
tenable. For Ackerman's project to be convincing, he must show the supe-
rior force of idealism to materialism as a determinant of government be-
havior and, perhaps, of individual behavior as well. The casualness of his
treatment of ideas in Reconstructing American Law suggests the contrary.
These problems stand as substantial obstacles to the completion of Ack-
erman's project. But consider the context of these criticisms. However im-
posing the obstacles seem, the project Ackerman has conceived is of far
greater dimension. Indeed, the ambition and sustained seriousness of the
author are extraordinary. There will be sufficient insight in any book by
Bruce Ackerman to make it worth reading. But Ackerman promises much
more.
72. See, e.g., PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 168-75; CLEAN COAL, supra note 48, at
66-74; UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 60, at 9-165.
73. Pp. 46-71.
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